














SEBASTIAN G. KESSING 
KAI A. KONRAD 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1791 
CATEGORY 2: PUBLIC CHOICE 
AUGUST 2006 
 
PRESENTED AT CESIFO AREA CONFERENCE ON 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 










High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if 
government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are 
interested in maximising their divisions’ output employ excess labor, since this induces the 
sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the 
public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide 
evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high 
employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic 
effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation. 
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Public employees and civil servants enjoy very high employment protection.
This holds, in particular, in many European countries where workers in the
public sector eﬀectively enjoy lifelong tenure once they have been hired.1
Such provisions turn labor into a ﬁxed factor. Based on this observation, we
develop a theory of strategic hiring in the public sector. Bureaucrats who
compete for centrally allocated budgets can exploit the durability of tenured
labor and tend to strategically over-employ.
The key to our argument is the complementary nature of productive in-
puts. Over-hiring tenured labor today increases a division’s ﬁxed wage bill
tomorrow, leaving fewer resources for other complementary inputs. This
distortion makes the under-used complementary inputs more productive at
the margin. Output-interested bureaucrats will spend all additional funds
received by their division on these complementary inputs. Since these ad-
ditional funds are very productive, in a situation of budget competition
between divisions, a central sponsor has an incentive to allocate more funds
to overstaﬀed divisions tomorrow. Bureaucrats who are only interested in
their own division foresee this incentive and resort to strategic hiring today.
Strategic hiring is a relevant problem in practice. First, particular bud-
get rules that shift hiring decisions to the upper levels in the bureacracy and
specify the break-up of budgets into spending categories are widespread, par-
ticularly in the public sector (Heymann 1988, Senf 1977). Our analysis can
explain why they exist, contributes to the current debate on speciﬁcv e r s u s
global budgets in favor of the former rules, and relates to the relationship
of formal and real authority (Aghion and Tirole 1997).
Second, strategic hiring is consistent with empirical evidence on inter-
governmental ﬁscal relations. The number of public employees at sub-
1T h i so b s e r v a t i o ni sd o c u m e n t e di nt h eﬁndings of Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005), who
analyse and document perceived job security empirically. Using data from the European
Community Household Panel from 12 European countries, they ﬁnd that, "...after con-
trolling for selection, workers feel most secure in permanent public jobs." They also ﬁnd
that perceived job security of public sector jobs is, contrary to private sector jobs, not
corrrelated with labor market institutions that provide insurance to workers, which leads
them to conclude that "public sector jobs are by and large perceived to be insulated from
labor market ﬂuctuations."
1national levels has signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on grant transfers from central
governments to these levels.2 Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) provide em-
pirical evidence from Russia, on how regional public employment has been
used by regional authorities to extract higher grants from the central gov-
ernment. They also provide a strategic theoretical perspective, but rely on
wage arrears at the regional level that create political unrest, which puts
pressure on the central government. Thus, their approach operates via the
political system and, as they stress, is more appropriate for countries with
weak institutions. Our strategic approach, based on tenure in the public
sector, is more direct and more widely relevant.
Third, strategic hiring is consistent with the well-documented higher
labor intensity in the public sector (see, for evidence, e.g., Dewenter and
Malatesta 2001). Intuitively, strategic hiring takes place where hiring deci-
sions yield strategic commitment and leads to excessive hiring in the equi-
librium. Since employment protection is much lower in the private sector,
the potential of using tenured labor strategically is much reduced or absent.
Thus, ceteris paribus, labor intensity should be lower in the private sector.3
Finally, we have some direct evidence on the perceptions of bureaucrats
on strategic hiring. We conducted a survey of all full-time professors at
the University of Hamburg, a public German university, in March 2006.4
This organization is characterized by extremely high employment protection.
Almost all professors are civil servants for life and cannot be ﬁred even if
the whole department or the whole university is closed. We asked questions
related to the ﬁlling of vacated professorships, since this is the predominant
2For the US, Grossman (1994) ﬁnds that a one percentage point increase in the number
of public employees per capita in a state increases the per capita grants received between
US$ 65 and US$ 131. For Switzerland, Feld and Schaltegger (2005) estimate that the
number of employees employed in the public administration at the Cantonal level increases
grant transfers from the central government, with an estimated elasticity of .6.
3High labor intensity in the public sector should be regarded as a multi-causal phenom-
enon in practice. It has also been attributed to political patronage and rent-seeking, Gelb
et al. (1991), Lopez de Silanes et al. (1997), and Alesina et al. (2000), or, alternatively,
to second best arguments, Gordon (2003), Poutvaara and Wagener (2004), and Rodrik
(2000).
4We distributed 506 questionnaires to the professors’ departmental addresses, and we
received 238 replies (47%). The questionnaire and the dataset of the results can be found
on the webpage http://www.wz-berlin.de/mp/mps/research/survey-results.en.htm.
2form of hiring in the university system. A summary of the results is given
in ﬁgure 1. First, 81.9% of the respondents think that their department has
an inﬂuence on the replacement of a professorship (85.9% if invalid answers
and "Don’t know" answers are left out).5 More importantly, 96.2% (99.1%)
of the them think that the replacement decisions for vacated professorships
are of strategic importance for the continuity and future development of
the department and of the courses oﬀered. 57.1% (63.6%) believe that the
replacement of vacated professorships leads to more overall resources for the
department in the medium run, compared to not replacing them. Similarly,
70.2% (75.9%) disagree with the claim that hiring reduces the department’s
overall resources, 57.6% (62.6%) disagree with the claim that hiring tenured
professors reduces non-tenured researchers in the department, and 73.1%
(76.3%) disagree with the claim that not hiring tenured staﬀ increases the
resources for each tenured professor. All results are highly signiﬁcant using
standard non-parametric tests. For example, with the given aggregation,
a standard binomial test of whether respondents’ answers do not support
strategic hiring with a probability of 0.5 or higher can be rejected at the
1% level for all relevant questions. Similarly, chi-square goodness of ﬁt tests
with hypothesized symmetric distributions for all four answer categories are
rejected at the 1% level. In summary, respondents are very aware of the
strategic role of tenured hiring decisions for the department and its future
resources.
We also asked whether there had been an increase or decrease in the
overall budget, in the number of tenured professorships and in the number
of short-term employees both in absolute numbers and in employees per
capita of tenured professors in the department, compared to 8 years ago.
The survey shows that the reduction in overall resources of a department is
positively correlated with the reduction in the number of tenured professors,
and that the change in the number of short term employees is also positively
correlated with the change in the number of professors.6 On the other hand,
5Respondents could check "completely agree", "somewhat agree", "somewhat dis-
agree", and "completely disagree", or "Don’t know". The given numbers aggregate the
two agree or disagree categories, respectively. For example, the 81.9% consist of 39.9%
that checked "completely agree" and the 42% that checked "somewhat agree".
6The correlation between the answers to questions about the departments resources
3Filling vacated professorships
is of strategical importance.
The faculty can influence the decision whether 
a vacated professorship is filled again or not.
Hiring tends to result in a better medium-term
development of the department's budget.
Not hiring temporarily causes a better 
endowment for the remaining professorships.
Hiring tends to result in a declining number
of research fellows (without professors).
Hiring reduces the overall amount 









Figure 1: Survey results on strategic hiring from the University of Hamburg
without invalid and "Don’t know" answers.
the change in the number of professors is not correlated with the change of
the average endowment of each tenured position with non-tenured labor.7
These correlations suggest that tenured professorships and other inputs are
complements. This will be an important element for a theory of strategic
hiring.
Little to nothing is known empirically about the determinants of hir-
ing decisions in the public sector. Evidence is either anecdotal, Gelb et al
(question 7) and the number of tenured professors in the department (question 8) as
measured by Kruskal’s γ is equal to -.68, and as measured by Kendall’s τb, -.43, and the
hypothesis that the latter is equal to 0 can be rejected at the 1% level. The relationship
between the answers to questions about the non-tenured researchers (question 10) and the
number of tenured professors in the department (question 8) as measured by Kruskal’s γ
is equal to -.19, and as measured by Kendall’s τb -.12, and the hypothesis that the latter
is equal to 0 can be rejected at the 5% level.
7The correlation between the answers to questions about the resources per professor
(question 10) and the number of tenured professorships in the department (question 8) as
measured by Kruskal’s γ is equal to -.03, and as measured by Kendall’s τb, -.02, and the
hypothesis that the latter is equal to 0 cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.76. Further
details of these calculations are given in the appendix.
4(1991), at the macro-level, Rodrik (2000), or indirect, Lopez-de-Silanes et
al. (1997). On the one hand, this lack of empirical evidence is due to a lack
of appropriate data. On the other hand, existing theories of public sector
hiring suﬀer from the problem that they do not provide suﬃciently sharp
predictions that would allow to discriminate between them. For example,
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of a number of politi-
cal and institutional variables on contracting out of US counties, but must
admit that they are unable to discriminate between diﬀerent theoretical ap-
proaches which can all explain their empirical results. Contrary to existing
theories, our theoretical perspective provides an empirical prediction that is
not shared by other explanations of public sector hiring policies. In partic-
ular, according to our perspective, strategic hiring should not be observed
if bureaucrats expect their budgets to increase suﬃciently in the future.
Our theory of strategic hiring is closely linked to two strands of the lit-
erature and can be seen as a contribution to both. First, a considerable
amount of work on political economy discusses the importance of decisions
with a lasting impact on future elections, and the signiﬁcance of these deci-
sions for the decision making of future governments. For instance, Persson
and Svensson (1989) discuss the commitment eﬀects of government debt for
future governments. More directly related to our analysis, Glazer (1989)
discusses the use of durable projects and how the choice of the durability
of a project may aﬀect future election outcomes and future policy decisions.
Crain and Oakley (1995) test this theory indirectly, conﬁrming that political
institutions that aﬀect the political sustainability of policy choices have an
impact on infrastructure spending. The common link between these analyses
and this paper is that durability yields commitment, and, hence, becomes a
strategic instrument.
Second, our analysis of budget competition is closely related to the lit-
erature on bureaucracy. Starting with Niskanen (1971), this literature has
been growing fast, see, e.g., Kraan (1996) for an overview. Much of the
literature considers the static problem, but some earlier work also addresses
multi-period issues, such as Carlsen and Haugen (1994) or Bagnoli and Mc-
Kee (1991). A central focus of this literature is on how to control the
bureaucrat who has an incentive to earn some rent from reduced eﬀort. We
5consider bureaucrats whose production opportunities are perfectly known, so
that actual slack, or agency rents from private information, can be avoided.
Our paper is closely related to Moene (1986) and Chan and Mestelman
(1988), who consider the strategic interaction between one bureaucrat and
his sponsor. Moene (1986), for instance, considers timing of decision mak-
ing between a bureau and the sponsor, where the bureau may try to trigger
higher payments by generating a high expenditure bill. Competition among
bureaucrats has also been considered in the literature by Bagnoli and McKee
(1991). They argue that such competition can be used as a disciplinary de-
vice. We show that, given the discretion of the bureaucrats in early periods,
the ineﬃciency emerges here precisely because of the competition between
divisions.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we outline our analytical framework.
In section 3, we characterize the eﬃciency benchmark case. In section 4, we
derive the main results on the role of tenured labor as a strategic instrument.
Secion 5 discusses our results and draws policy conclusions.
2 The analytical framework
Consider a simple two period framework of a government with a bureaucracy
that consists of divisions i = x,y. The government has an overall budget Bt
for each period t =1 ,2 and divides this between the two divisions such that
Bt = bxt + byt (1)
in each period, where bit denotes divisions’ budgets in the respective pe-
riod t. Each division is headed by a bureaucrat who freely allocates the
bureau’s budget between two input factors, one of which is durable, and
w h o s eq u a n t i t yi su s e di np e r i o dt by division i. The quantity of this input
is denoted lit. We call the durable factor tenured labor. The other factor is
non-durable. Its quantity is denoted zit. This factor describes inputs such
as paper, pencils, electricity, rented oﬃce space, or even durable goods that
can, however, be sold at the end of a period.
We consider a partial model in which the governmental sector is only
a small part of the whole economy so that the factor input choices in the
6divisions do not aﬀect equilibrium factor prices, and we normalize all factor
prices to unity. The assumption of ﬁxed wages is particularly plausible for
the public sector as wages are typically negotiated centrally and workers
are classiﬁed into a rigid wage structure which does not leave any wage
discretion to division heads within the bureaucracy. The budget constraint
of the bureaucrat in division i in period t can be written as
bit ≥ lit + zit for t =1 ,2, (2)
and expenditure on lit and zit are chosen by the division’s bureaucrat at the
beginning of each respective period once the size bit of the period budget is
known to the division.
As the civil servants are tenured, employment decisions made in period
t =1have a lasting impact on employment in period t =2 . We will describe
this with the constraint
li2 ≥ min{li1,b i2}.( 3 )
This constraint states that no civil servant can be ﬁred if the current budget
is suﬃciently large to pay the wage bill. For completeness, (3) also states
what happens if the period-2 budget of a division is smaller than the wage
bill of the set of civil servants who were hired in period 1. We assume that,
in this case, the division has to spend all its budget on the wage bill, and
nothing on the variable factor of production.
Turn now to the outputs xt and yt of the divisions. Output is produced
by a standard twice continuously diﬀerentiable time invariant production
function
xt = f(lxt,z xt) and yt = f(lyt,z yt),( 4 )
with f(0,z)=f(l,0) = 0,a n dw i t hﬁrst and second partial derivatives
fl > 0, fz > 0,f ll < 0, fzz < 0. Symmetry of the divisions in terms of
their production technologies is mainly for notational parsimony. A key
assumption as regards f is flz > 0 as, together with the tenure constraint
(3), this complementarity will make high commitments to labor a useful
strategic choice from the point of view of the bureaucrat.
We now turn to the objective functions of the government and of the
bureaucrats. The government positively values divisions’ output and nega-
tively values their expenditures. But, as the aggregate expenditure of the
7government is exogenously given here, we can disregard this element in the
objective function. The government’s objective function can therefore be
written as
G = G1 + G2 with Gt = G(xt,y t),( 5 )
which is symmetric, G(x,y)=G(y,x),w i t hG(x,0) = G(0,y), and has par-
tial derivatives ∂Gt/∂xt > 0,∂ G t/∂yt > 0, ∂2Gt/(∂xt)2 ≤ 0, ∂2Gt/(∂yt)2 ≤
0, and ∂2Gt/(∂xt∂yt) ≥ 0 for all (x,y) with min{x,y} > 0. The concavity of
G in each output maps the idea that a government is responsible for supply-
ing a mix of outputs. If outputs are perfect substitutes, a government will
typically avoid the the ineﬃcient budget competition of diﬀerent bureaus by
eliminating all but one of these bureaus. Symmetry is again for simplicity
only.
The government’s objective function may represent its constituency’s
preferences more or less well. Since we focus on the incentive problems be-
tween the government and the bureaucracy, we disregard any agency prob-
lems between the politician and his constituency and consider the objective
function (5) to be the measure of eﬃciency.
Finally, we consider the objective functions of the chief bureaucrats of
the divisions. The theory of bureaucracy that was brieﬂy discussed in the
introduction provides a diversity of possible assumptions about what bu-
reaucrats may care about, but what all these assumptions have in common
is that the bureaucrat cares about his own division, maybe its size or its
output etc. A simple assumption that is plausible and more generally in
line with bureaucracy theory is that the chief bureaucrat of divison i cares
about the total output of his division,
x = x1 + x2 and y = y1 + y2.( 6 )
These objective functions are taken as given. From a contract theory per-
spective, the framework is one in which the set of feasible contracts is very
limited: the central government can allocate a ﬁxed budget, and the division
head can use it to produce according to his own preferences, which cannot
be aﬀected further by the central government with contractual arrangements
for reasons outside the scope of this analysis. But, as evident from (5) and
(6), the preferences of the division head are partially aligned with those of
the government.
8The more balanced preferences of the government could, for instance,
be due to considerations about the preferences of their constituency and
the government’s concerns about re-election, but for brevity are taken as
given here (5). Note that the objective functions of the government and
the bureaucrat implicitly assume (for simplicity) equal weight given to both
periods.
3E ﬃciency
Consider the eﬃcient allocation as a benchmark case. For convenience,
denote eﬃcient quantities by respective Greek letters. Deﬁne λt(b) and
ζt(b)=b − λt(b) as the production cost eﬃcient inputs of lit and zit,r e -
spectively, if the division’s budget is b in the respective period. They have
no subscripts because they are invariant with respect to time or division, as
the production function f is not division speciﬁc and is time invariant. For







Using the symmetry assumption of G,t h ee ﬃcient allocation can be char-
acterized as follows.
Proposition 1 For B2 ≥ B1, the allocation that maximizes the value of
the objective function of the government is characterized by bit = Bt
2 ,a n d
lit = λ(Bt




A formal proof is omitted. The proposition states that the eﬃcient
solution requires production eﬃciency in both periods and in all divisions,
and this is described by the optimal factor input mix for a given budget.
For given budgets, this also determines the eﬃcient labor intensity, λ
b−λ.
Throughout the analysis, we assume B2 ≥ B1 and disregard the possibil-
ity of a squeeze of the total budget, although a budget squeeze is interesting
as well. For B2 <B 1, a second-best problem emerges and adds complexity:
in the case of a budget squeeze with tenured civil servants, the ﬁrst-best
equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 1 cannot be attained. The
labor intensity that is ﬁrst-best in period 1, if chosen, induces an ineﬃciency
9in period 2: the period-2 budget is too small to ﬁnance both a labor choice
larger or equal to the period-1 choice and the eﬃcient amount of the variable
input that comes together with this labor choice. It will also generally re-
quire optimally less labor to be employed in period 1 than would be optimal
for the static period-1 problem taken in isolation. Accordingly, for a budget
squeeze, the eﬃciency benchmark becomes more diﬃcult, and the compar-
ison between the eﬃcient outcome and the equilibrium outcome becomes
less transparent than for the case in Proposition 1. The analysis of a budget
squeeze would, however, reveal that the strategic incentive to over-hire civil
servants in an early period is also at work if a squeeze of the overall budget
is anticipated.
4 Equilibrium
Consider the time structure of decisions. In period 1, in a stage 0,t h e
government decides how to split the available budget B1 among the divisions.
The choice can be described in general by some vector b1 ≡ (bx1,b y1) for
which (1) holds. For an analysis of the strategic incentives of the divisions
of the bureacracy, we assume that the government splits the budget evenly
b e t w e e nt h et w od i v i s i o n si np e r i o d1 ,w i t hbx1 = by1 = B1/2 as the reference
point, as this is what would happen in the eﬃciency benchmark case in
Proposition 1. In stage 1, the bureaucrats decide on li1 and zi1, subject
to the budget constraint (2). Then the period outputs accrue and period
1e n d s . I np e r i o d2 ,ﬁrst, in stage 2, the government allocates B2 to the
divisions, and the allocation chosen is described by a vector b2 ≡ (bx2,b y2)
for which (1) holds. Then, in stage 3, the bureaucrats choose how to spend
their budgets on li2 and zi2, subject to the budget constraint (2) and the
labor constraint (3). Finally, output accrues and the game ends.
Proposition 2 Let B1 = B2 ≡ B,a n dl e tbx1 = by1 = B/2.T h e n , i n




2 ). Outputs in both periods in both divisions
are smaller than the eﬃcient quantities.
10Proof. For a proof, ﬁrst consider stage 3 in period 2. The equilibrium






li2 = bi2 if bi2 <l i1
li2 = li1 if bi2 ∈ [li1,β(li1))
li2 = λ(bi2) if bi2 ≥ β(li1)
(8)
for i = x,y. It is a function of labor input in period 1 and of the division
budget in period 2,w h e r eβ(li1) is deﬁned by the condition λ(β(li1)) = li1.
Equation (8) makes use of the fact that the division maximizes output in
period 2, choosing factor inputs as close to the eﬃcient input combination
as possible, but respects the tenure constraint (3). Accordingly, the output
in stage 3 is also determined jointly by employment in period 1 and by the
size of the division’s budget in period 2, and is equal to
x∗
2 = f(l∗
x2,b x2 − l∗
x2) and y∗
2 = f(l∗
y2,b y2 − l∗
y2).( 9 )
Turning now to the budget allocation decision in stage 2 at the begin-
ning of period 2, the government chooses b2 to maximize x∗
2 +y∗
2 subject to
(1) for t =2 ,w i t hx∗
2 and y∗
2 deﬁn e di n( 9 ) .I flx1 + ly1 ≥ B2,t h e nG2 =0
is implied for all possible allocations of the budget among the two divisions,
and we assume that the government allocates B2 in this case such that also
x∗
2 = y∗
2 =0 .8 If lx1 +ly1 <B 2, then the government can and will avoid the
minimum payoﬀ G2 =0by making bi2 >l i1 for both divisions i = x,y.I t
will maximize G2 by a choice of b2. On the basis of the assumptions about














This describes the equilibrium in the continuation games for any given l1.
Turning now to stage 1, consider the marginal incentives of the head of
division x who anticipates a given choice of ly1 by division y and anticipates
the equilibrium paths in the continuation game for stages 2 and 3. The
8This is an equilibrium selection assumption that is important as it avoids a number of
ineﬃcient equilibria in which the divisions very much overinvest, anticipating that G =0 ,
but that the government will allocate the major share to one bureau in order to generate
at least some positive output in x or y.
11marginal condition that determines the payoﬀ increase from an increase in




















Let B1 = B2 ≡ B and bx1 = by1 = B
2 .F o ra n ylx1 = ly1 <λ (B
2 ),t h el a s tt w o
terms on the right-hand side in (11) are zero, as (3) will be non-binding, and
∂x1
∂lx1 > ∂x1
∂zx1. Accordingly, lx1 <λ (B
2 ) is suboptimal from the perspective of
division x, and analogously for division y.
Further, for lx1 = ly1 = λ(B
2 ), ∂x1
∂lx1 = ∂x1
∂zx1.M o r e o v e r ,
∂x∗
2
∂lx1 =0 .A t
the eﬃcient input mix, the output does not change if one marginal unit








∂bx2 > 0. To consider the eﬀect of a marginal increase in lx1 from λ(B
2 ) to
slightly above λ(B
2 ),w ed i ﬀerentiate the governmental optimality condition
(10) totally with respect to lx1 and bx2 at li1 = λ(B
2 ) for i = x,y,t a k i n g









In an interior equilibrium, ∂Θ2
∂bx2 < 0 by the second-order condition for the
budget allocation in period 2 to establish a local maximum of the govern-
ment’s payoﬀ in period 2. The sign of dbx2























∂lx1 =0at B1 = B2 ≡ B, bx1 = by1 = B
2 ,a n dlx1 = ly1 = λ(B
2 ),a n d







if evaluated at limlx1&λ(bx2).T h i sc a nb ec o n ﬁrmed as follows. First, ∂G2
∂x2 >






∂zx2∂lx2 = fxz > 0.
The ﬁrst equality holds because, for given lx1 >λ (B
2 ), the increase in the
period-2 budget is used for an increase in zx2, hence driving up the marginal
12product of lx2. This shows that lx1 = ly1 = λ(B
2 ) can not be a symmetric
interior equilibrium either.
Ineﬃciency in the production of x and y is an implication of li1 = li2 >
λ(B
2 ) in a symmetric equilibrium as this implies an ineﬃciently high labor
intensity in both periods. As the total budget for factor inputs is exogenously
given, it implies a reduction in xt and yt in both periods compared to the
eﬃcient output level. This completes the proof.
The intuition for the proof is straightforward from condition (11) if this
condition is evaluated at B1 = B2 ≡ B, bx1 = by1 = B
2 ,a n dlx1 = ly1 =
λ(B
2 ). At this point, an increase in lx1 has no ﬁrst-order eﬀects on x1 or
x2, if the budget of the x-division remains unchanged, and does not change
this division’s payoﬀ. However, such a change will increase lx2 above its
ﬁrst-best level in period 1. As this tends to increase the marginal product
of zx2, it makes it valuable for the government to shift the budget and to
increase the budget of the x-division, which uses this budget increase in
the factor zx that has the increased factor productivity. Of course, both
divisions are inclined to use period-1 labor as a commitment device, and, as
the overall budget in period 2 is ﬁxed, this will increase labor intensity in
the equilibrium above the eﬃcient level.
Budget competition by several bureaus is important for our result. If,
for instance, there is only one bureau that produces x, and the government
simply allocates an exogenously given budget B to this bureau in both pe-
riods, then this bureau chooses the eﬃcient labor input lx1 = lx2 = λ(B) in
both periods.9
The proposition and its proof essentially state a negative result: an ef-
ﬁcient choice of li1 by both bureaucrats cannot be an equilibrium. To turn
this into a more positive result, consider an example with B1 = B2 ≡ B,
Gt =l nxt+lnyt, and with a Cobb-Douglas production technology in which
both factors enter symmetrically, f(l,z)=l1/2z1/2. If the budget allocation
in period 1 was bx1 = by1 = B/2, then straightforward calculations show
9A similar strategic eﬀect emerges in a context with one government and one bureau-
crat, however, if the government budget is endogenous, and the government has increasing
marginal cost of higher public expenditure. In this case, a single bureaucrat would also
strategically overhire labor in the ﬁrst period and induce a higher budget in period 2. The
equilibrium can also be characterized by ineﬃciently high labor intensity in this case.




, li1 = li2 =
4B
14




whereas an eﬃcient allocation is characterized by li1 = zi1 = li2 = zi2 = B
4 .
This example shows that each bureau uses tenured labor in order to induce
the government to allocate a higher budget share to this bureau. Both
bureaus end up with equal budget shares in period 2, as their eﬀorts just
net out each other, and both bureaus produce with a labor intensity that is
higher than what would be optimal, given the symmetry between the two
factors in the production technology.
Consider the robustness of Proposition 2. First, the complementarity
of l and z in production is a key property that drives the result. However,
this assumption is seemingly plausible for the relationship between tenured
labor and the set of all other variable production inputs. Second, an interior
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists for many parametric forms of
the government’s preferences, the divisions’ preferences, and the production
technology, but not for all parametric speciﬁcations. In particular, if x and
y are perfect substitutes from the perspective of the government, then the
government’s willingness to shift budget to the division that committed to
higher labor input is not moderated by the fact that this will also increase
the share in total output produced by this division, and this may lead to
extreme outcomes in which the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. These
equilibria will still exhibit a tendency for commitment to too high a labor
input, but in a stochastic sense. Third, the framework can be generalized
to more than two divisions. If the numbe ro fd i v i s i o n si sl a r g e ,t h i sw i l la l s o
make extreme outcomes with mixed strategy equilibria and over-hiring in a
s t o c h a s t i cs e n s em o r el i k e l y .T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sp r o p e r t yi sa sf o l l o w s .I f
there are many divisions, the decision of one division to increase its labor
commitment in period 1 will draw an even larger share of the overall period-
2 budget to this division. The reason for this increased budget reaction
is that reallocating an additional 100 dollars to division i will not require
100 dollars to be taken away from one other division, but only 1/(n − 1)
dollars from each of the other divisions. The opportunity cost of a budget
withdrawal from another division is convex in the size of this withdrawal.
14The withdrawal of a given amount from many other divisions therefore has a
lower opportunity cost than the withdrawal of this amount from one single
division. Fourth, suppose the currentp e r i o d1i ss h o r ti nc o m p a r i s o nt o
period 2, or that labor that is employed in period 1 yields commitment not
only in one, but in many future periods. In this case, the cost of hiring
an ineﬃcient composition of input factors in period 1 are similar, but the
beneﬁts of its strategic commitment value accrue in a longer future period,
or in many future periods. Accordingly, the incentives to hire excessive labor
today are reinforced if it yields commitment for many periods.
The constraint (3) is crucial for the result in proposition 2. If, for in-
stance, this constraint does not apply, then, in the equilibrium, the chief
bureaucrat in each respective division will simply maximize x2 or y2 in pe-
riod 2, and will choose the optimal factor input mix for achieving this. The
optimization problems in period 1 and period 2 become fully independent,
and a choice of a large li1 does not increase this division’s period-2 budget,
which, in turn, makes it suboptimal to deviate from the eﬃcient input mix
in period 1 as well. This is summarized as a proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider the continuation game without tenure, i.e., if the
constraint (3) need not hold. If the government allocates B1 symmetrically
among the divisions, then the equilibrium is characterized by
bi1 = bi2 =
B
2




The outcome of the budget competition also depends on the relative size
of the total budget today versus the size of the budget tomorrow. This eﬀect
is not directly visible from comparing the outcomes in propositions 1 and 2,
as, in proposition 2, it was assumed that the budget size does not change
over time.
We will now show that the strategic incentive vanishes in a situation
with a suﬃciently strong budget increase.
















are equilibrium values of choices in a symmetric, subgame perfect pure strat-
egy equilibrium.
15Proof. Note that li1 ≤ bi1.S i n c e λ(B2
2 ) >b i1,i ft h eg o v e r n m e n tc h o o s e s
bi2 = B2
2 , the constraint (3) is never binding in period 2, regardless of the




2 ), and this maximizes G2 for this given period-2 budget.
Accordingly, by choosing bi2 = B2
2 , the government can implement eﬃciency
in period 2, regardless of li1 ∈ [0,b i1], and it is optimal to do so. Since
bureaucrats cannot aﬀect the allocation in period 2, they maximize x1 and
y1 respectively. To do so, they choose the eﬃcient labor input li1 = λ(B1
2 ).





>b i1, a strong expansion of the budget may be required,
but suﬃcient budget growth eliminates the strategic impact of some produc-
tion decisions in earlier periods, even if they yield long-term commitment
to some factor inputs. In comparison to the results in proposition 2, this
illustrates that growth of the bureaucracy is important for the eﬃciency of
the bureaucrats’ decisions. Furthermore, the result in proposition 4 provides
a hypothesis about the labor intensity in the public sector as a function of
expected changes in the overall budget. This hypothesis is speciﬁct oo u r
theory and provides a potentially testable implication of our theory that
distinguishes the strategic overhiring motive from other hiring motivations
in the public sector.
Proposition 4 can be illustrated with the parametric example introduced
above. Suppose B1 =2 , and, hence, bx1 = by1 =1 ,a n dl e tB2 =1 0 .
Whatever the ﬁrst period hiring decisions of the bureaucrats are, li1 ≤ bi1 =
1 for i = x,y. In the second period, the government will distribute B2
such that this distribution maximizes G2. It will, hence, share this budget
equally between the two bureaus if B2 ≥ 2, as this will induce lx2 = ly2 =
B2/4=2 .5, regardless of the previous choice of li1 ≤ 1, and will maximize
G2. Put diﬀerently, if the maximum amount of labor hired in the ﬁrst period
is smaller than what is the unconstrained optimal amount of labor in the
second period, then hiring in period 2 cannot impose any constraint on the
second period, and cannot be used as a strategic instrument.
165 Discussion and conclusions
A key prediction of the strategic hiring incentives is the high labor inten-
sity in sectors with high employment protection. Alternative theories may,
however, lead to observationally equivalent predictions. The result of propo-
sition 4 provides an implication of strategic hiring that is speciﬁc and not
shared by other potential explanations: the overhiring will be pronounced in
non-expansionary time periods, but not in periods in which the bureaucrats
anticipate major budget increases. This prediction can be contrasted with
some alternative motivations driving public employment decisions. Consider
political patronage and rent-seeking motivations, or, alternatively, public
employment in a second-best world with distortionary taxation. For both
these motivations, no clear cut hypothesis about diﬀerences between ex-
pected expansionary and non-expansionary time periods stands out. In
summary, provided appropriate data were available, our approach could be
tested empirically given its unique prediction.
Strategic hiring in the public sector triggered by high employment pro-
tection may also apply in a much broader sense. Consider the situation in
which a sponsor’s funding decision takes on a discrete nature, i.e., when the
decision concerns closing down a division entirely or not. If it is diﬃcult
to reallocate labor eﬃciently across units, hiring tenured labor serves some
sort of "division entrenchment". If the decision is to close one of two units,
this can be seen as an extreme form of budget competition. Obviously,
also in this case, hiring tenured labor has a strategic value for a bureaucrat
interested in the survival of her division.
The results have policy conclusions for the optimal organization of the
public sector. Given the ineﬃciency caused by strategic hiring, one should
observe the formation of institutions that limit or control hiring decisions.
Such institutions are indeed widespread in the public sector.10 Restrictions
on hiring are often deeply embedded in budgetary laws and procedures. In
Germany, for example, budgeting has to follow the principle of qualitative
speciﬁcity (qualitative Spezialität), which maintains that budgets are not
global, but must be spent according to the speciﬁc spending categories (An-
10Heymann (1988) provides evidence that some higher level controls on hiring decisions
exist in the public sector of all OECD countries.
17del 1983, Senf 1977).11 Such restrictions suﬀer from various problems. The
organization structure in the public sector is more complex in practice than
in a stylized two-level framework. Public sector bureaucracies are character-
ized by multi-level hierarchies. Restricting hiring decisions at a given level
shifts the decision problem to the next higher level. But the higher level
has similar incentives for the whole organization governed by this level. In
fact, this explains why hiring restrictions only work imperfectly in practice
even if they are formally in place. Consider the case in which the analyti-
cal two-level framework is extended by allowing for a second sponsor with
two subalternate divisions and an additional top-level sponsor that allocates
the budgets to the two sponsors. The mid-level sponsors themselves may
now be more lenient than is optimal with respect to divisional demands for
additional permanent labor because the sponsor herself competes with the
other sponsor for budgets and aims at strategically increasing her budget at
the other’s expense. Thus, restricting hiring decisions at one level may only
move the problem to the next level, which then has insuﬃcient incentives to
enforce such regulations.12
Taking this argument to the limit leads to the conclusion that all budgets
should be completely speciﬁed at the highest level of government bureau-
cracy to avoid the eﬃciency costs of strategic hiring. Of course, this implies
that the public sector would entirely dispose of the informational beneﬁts of
decentralized decision-making. This points to a fundamental trade-oﬀ that
has to be resolved in the organization of the public sector. Avoiding strate-
gic hiring requires strict and speciﬁc budgetary rules and hiring controls.
These provisions come at the cost of centralized decision-making, and these
factors need to be weighed against one another. As a corollary, we can point
11A similar argument can be made for bureaucratic rules that pre-specify the input mix
ratio. If this ratio is ﬁxed, this provides a commitment mechanism for the sponsor not to
ﬁnance complentary inputs ex post.
12The relevance of this problem can also be inferred from the survey results we presented
in the introduction. The departments in a German public university also get speciﬁed
budgets, and therefore have no formal authority to hire freely tenured labor. In reality,
however, they have some discretion and can inﬂuence the hiring decisions, given their
information advantage and their inﬂuence on the budgeting process. This is reﬂected
in the responses of the professors reported in ﬁgure 1. 81.9% (85.9%) agree that their
department can inﬂuence the hiring decision.
18out that a move towards more independent budgeting at lower levels of gov-
ernment and towards global budgets is more likely to increase eﬃciency if
employment protection is lower and / or wages are more ﬂexible.
The trade-oﬀ between the incentives for strategic hiring and the eﬃcient
use of information that is available only at the lower levels of bureaucracy is
related to the analysis of formal and real authority in organizations as de-
veloped by Aghion and Tirole (1997) in a principal-agent framework. They
contrast the beneﬁts of delegation, which are given by agents’ incentives to
acquire information and to participate in selected projects, with the costs of
delegation, which are given by the principal’s loss of control over the choice
of projects. Our approach stresses that the costs of delegation not only arise
from the conﬂict of interest between the principal and the agent, but that
the latter can be reinforced by the strategic behavior of the agents. In par-
ticular, if bureaucrats are competing for the allocation of budgets, tenure in
the public sector allows them to resort to strategic hiring with substantial
costs regarding production eﬃciency. Thus, the optimal allocation of deci-
sion rights and budgets within the public sector needs to take into account
the beneﬁts of delegation, its potential costs caused by misalignments of in-
terests, the scope for strategic behavior, and the eﬀectiveness of restrictions
at individual levels of the bureaucracy.
Summarizing, institutions, such as divisions in a government bureau-
cracy or departments in a university, that can hire persons on long-term or
tenured positions may want to use such hiring as a tool that yields commit-
ment power in future budget allocations. This leads to too much hiring in
such strategic positions. This theory is in line with, and explains restrictions
on, the autonomy of hiring decisions which are widespread in the public sec-
tor. It is also consistent with the empirical evidence on labor intensity in
the public sector, the observed pattern of inter-governmental transfers in
federations, as well as with survey evidence of professors at a major German
university that shows that public sector decision makers are indeed aware
of the role of strategic hiring.
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